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beginning of five members it has become a full-fledged organization representing all ten states of 
the region. Guided by The ASEAN Charter 2007, ASEAN has firmly established itself as the 
regional organization of Southeast Asia and has won the respect of the world community. The 
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economic, political, social and cultural fields. Despite this very substantial progress, intra-
ASEAN relations are from time to time bogged down by many formidable problems in its 
principles, some of which are related to security issues, environmental problems and territorial 
rights. This paper will discuss the development and transformation of ASEAN from old to new 
communitarian agenda, the problem with the concept of “ASEAN Way” and three critical issues 
which the ASEAN Community needs to tackle urgently. 
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The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was born from the Bangkok Declaration 
on 8 August 1967. It was formed after the five foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand agreed to sign the ASEAN Declaration in Bangkok. Brunei 
joined the group in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999 
bringing ASEAN‟s current membership to ten. ASEAN is not, however the first attempt to 
achieve regionalism in Southeast Asia. Prior to ASEAN, ASA (Association of Southeast Asia) 
and MAPHILINDO (for Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia) were created in 1961 and 1963 
respectively (Phanit, 1980: 27). Much of the political turbulence that was a hallmark of politics 
in maritime Southeast Asia prior to ASEAN‟s formation eventually dissipated as the regional 
organization cohered in the 1970s and 1980s. Structurally, ASEAN functioned well within the 
framework of the Cold War since it amalgamated the interests of the non-communist countries of 
Southeast Asia, despite being predominantly anchored in the maritime region and in particular 
the Malay Archipelago comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Quite apart from its anti-
communist character, ASEAN evolved to provide familiarity and accommodation between the 
indigenous political elite and also significantly enhanced regime legitimacy for nation-building 
and developmental purposes (Ganesan 2004). The “ASEAN Way” that evolved is non-intrusive 
in the domestic political affairs of member states and included the joint agreement to renounce 
aggression in the resolution of inter-state disputes. 
 
Amitav Acharya (2001: 207) discussed in his 2001 book a painful fact – the existence of 
“intra-mural polarization and factionalism” in ASEAN. He wrote that ASEAN is polarised in 
three different ways: “The first is a liberal-conservative division based on degree of commitment 
to human rights and democracy, with Thailand and the Philippines in the former camp, and the 
rest of ASEAN members in the other. The second is a classic North-South divide, or the prospect 
of a two-tier regional system of ASEAN haves and ASEAN have nots, based on uneven levels of 
present and future development, a polarisation between the old and new members, which many 
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believe has already happened. Last but not least, ASEAN is facing a divide between a pro-
interventionist camp who favor constructive intervention/flexible engagement, such as Thailand 
and the Philippines, and a pro-sovereignty camp of the rest of ASEAN members who keep the 
grouping firmly wedded to strict non-interference, quiet diplomacy and constructive engagement. 
These emerging divisions within ASEAN are especially problematic in view of its traditional 
commitment to consensus-based agenda setting and decision making.” Therefore, this paper will 
focus especially on the first and third factors and analyse them from the perspective of 
communitarianism.  
 
As a regional community, ASEAN‟s two main goals basically are economic development 
(growth, cultural development and social progress) and regional peace and stability (Kivimaki, 
2008:434). Thanat Khoman coined a term “collective political defence” to describe one of 
ASEAN‟s goals (Acharya, 2000: 84). Besides, in order to maintain the sovereignty of all 
member states, ASEAN embrace the concept of the “ASEAN Way” that upholds non-
intervention or non-interference principle.  
 
However, ASEAN, in its fifth year of existence, realises that it needs to transform in 
order to be relevant in the future. Due to the increase of a regional cooperation framework and 
criticisms from abroad and within ASEAN, especially on its approaches which are considered as 
too state-centric and uncommitted to human rights, ASEAN agrees to make an overall review of 
its organisation and procedural framework. Although it tries to protect its communitarian 
identity, it identifies several proposals to strengthen the organisation, such as the need for greater 
self-reliance, the need for coordinated and well planned strategy on both national and regional 
levels for more effective cooperation, and nation resilience for each member to enable it to face 
present changes and challenges for the future with greater self-confidence. But ASEAN ministers 
also recognise formally that the principle of consensus in decision-making (musyawarah) should 
be maintained and the principle of equality becomes more enshrined (Solidum, 2003: 80). 
Therefore, it is clear that there is transformation within ASEAN which is between the Old 
Communitarian approach to a new Neo-Communitarianism, especially in the process of ASEAN 
to form what is called the “ASEAN Community” by the year 2015. The process of 
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transformation will be elaborated in this paper. A list of issues will also be discussed in order to 
argue whether ASEAN is still relevant and can be effective in resolving most of the bilateral and 
multilateral issues involving ASEAN member states.  
 




Regional cooperation to build stable relations in Southeast Asia has become known as the 
“ASEAN Way”. This concept was at first introduced in response to not only the ideological 
conflict between the Western Liberalism and Eastern Communism during the Cold War but also 
to maintain and protect ASEAN identity which is based on communitarianism. Later, this 
concept was accepted and imbedded in the ASEAN principles guiding relations between the 
ASEAN states. A collaborative approach emphasises three fundamental standards: 
 
1. Non-interference or non-intervention in other member states‟ domestic affairs, as 
underscored in the United Nations Charter, Article 2(7); 
2. Consensus building and cooperative programs rather than legally binding treaties (but in 
an exceptional situation, a binding agreement may be possible); 
3. Preference for national implementation of programs rather than reliance on a strong 
region-wide bureaucracy. 
 
The emphasis on consensus is also reflected in ASEAN methods for dispute resolution. In the 
Pacific region, due to the influence of the British Commonwealth, most disagreements are settled 
with formal judicial methods (Cameron and Ramsay 1996). Disagreements between the nations 
of ASEAN, on the other hand, are generally settled through conciliation and consultation, which 
is seen as a way to minimise tensions and avoid unnecessary conflicts (Narine 1999). 
 
Since the end of 1990s, there were demands to transform this concept especially since the 
end of Cold War when the liberal West declared triumphalism after the communist East 
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collapsed. The critics also argued that the “ASEAN Way” emphasises too much consensus and 
quiet diplomacy as opposed to institutionalised rules and direct criticism of individual member 
states (Haacke 2003: 59; Eldridge 2002: 60). ASEAN regimes have refrained from engaging 
fellow governments over claims of human rights abuses (Verma 2002: 114). The “ASEAN Way” 
seems to privilege sovereignty, noninterference, and consensus to the benefit of regimes that are 
less transparent or accountable but seemingly more effective. 
 
 
In 1997, a coup in Cambodia caused the association to delay plans to admit that country 
to membership. This issue questioned the ASEAN‟s commitment to a noninterference approach. 
The issue was security, not democracy and this gave an opportunity for some liberal supporters 
among the ASEAN leadership to propose changes to the “ASEAN Way” concept. For instance, 
Malaysia‟s Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim used the occasion to suggest that ASEAN 
consider undertaking “constructive interventions” to prevent future state failure in Southeast 
Asia, including helping countries at risk to improve their election procedures and reform their 
administrations while strengthening civil society and the rule of law (Emmerson 2008: 77-78). 
 
 
Meanwhile, in 1998, Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan went further by proposing that 
ASEAN adopt a policy of “flexible engagement” that would modify the principle of non-
interference to allow the Association “to play a constructive role in preventing or resolving 
domestic issues with regional implications.” That said, it was still security and not democracy 
that he had in mind: “When a matter of domestic concern poses a threat to regional stability, a 
dose of peer pressure or friendly advice at the right time can be helpful” (Emmerson 2008: 77-
78). 
 
In response, Malaysia‟s Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi bluntly rejected “flexible 
engagement” and reaffirmed non-interference. This was later followed by some officials from 
Brunei, Burma, Laos, and Singapore. At their 1998 annual meeting, the ASEAN foreign 
ministers completed the watering-down of Anwar‟s originally intrusive language to a euphemism 
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– “enhanced interaction” – bland enough not to jeopardise the “ASEAN Way” (Emmerson 2008: 
77-78). At the time these events unfolded, Thailand and the Philippines were the only Free 
countries in Southeast Asia, while Malaysia was Partly Free (Emmerson 2008: 77-78). It is not 
coincidental that the two most democratic governments in the region, those of Thailand and the 
Philippines, should have constituted a vanguard urging ASEAN to revise, however modestly, the 
principle of non-interference. Leaders of polities that allow for criticism of their own rulers are, 
other things being equal, less likely to feel threatened by criticism from other regimes 
(Emmerson 2008: 77-78). This also shows that there was an attempt to transform ASEAN as an 
organization and liberalise the “ASEAN Way” and communitarian values embraced by ASEAN 
society. It was not a surprise when the two most liberal states in Southeast Asia supported this 
transformation. This agenda is continuing and became stronger when Surin was appointed 
Secretary General of ASEAN in 2008.    
 
Before his appointment, in June 2007, Surin said that ASEAN needed “a lot of 
rethinking, retooling and readjusting,” in part because of “fierce” foreign pressure – a likely 
reference to Western impatience over Burma (Emmerson 2008: 77-78). On 1 January 2008, he 
began a five-year term as Secretary-General of ASEAN. Six months later, the extent to which he 
would rethink, retool, and readjust the organization was still unclear, especially given his limited 
capacity, as a manager with ten avowedly sovereign bosses looking over his shoulder, to reform 
the Association.  
 
 
According to Donald K. Emmerson (2008: 77-78), Secretary General Surin may not be 
able to reform ASEAN. Malaysia may never be upgraded from Partly Free to Free. Anwar may 
never become its Prime Minister; and even if he does, he may decide not to rock ASEAN‟s boat 
with controversy over democratisation. But Emmerson‟s larger points remain: The balance of 
democracy versus autocracy across the membership of the Association will affect the extent to 
which regionalism in Southeast Asia opposes, ignores, or favours democratisation. Yet the actual 
dynamics of regionally influenced democratization. If it does occur, it will likely have more to 
do with opportunities seized than with structural forces inexorably making themselves felt. In 
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order to accommodate this new idea or approach for transformation of ASEAN, Surin set up the 
future agenda of establishing the ASEAN Community by the year 2015. Therefore, such 
compromise needs to be struck because it involves the identity and values of ASEAN society as 
a whole. This has brought, as an ASEAN Community is being established, a transformation from 




FROM OLD COMMUNITARIANISM TO NEO-COMMUNITARIAN 
 
 
Old and Neo-Communitarianism maintain that two arguments are important; Communal Values 
and Common Good. Old Communitarians are intolerant toward liberal values where they argue 
the opposite. For instance, Old Communitarianism favours community over individual, 
responsibility/duty over rights, consensus elite deliberation, state-oriented decision-making, and 
discourages civil society involvement. The Old Communitarian arguments are embedded closely 
with the arguments of Asian values propagated by former ASEAN leaders such as Lee Kuan 
Yew of Singapore, Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia and Suharto of Indonesia. However, Neo-
Communitarians are more flexible and willing to blend liberal arguments together. Therefore, it 
seems that Neo-Communitarians are arguing slightly differently from Old Communitarians 
where they embrace approaches especially in balancing community with individual, balancing 
responsibility/duty with rights, inclining toward consensus public deliberation, supporting 
people-oriented decision-making, and encouraging civil society involvement. 
 
However, to argue about old and new Communitarianism from a foreign policy 
perspective, the communitarian approach must draw on a triple test (Etzioni, 2006):  
1. Does a policy represent a convergence of interests of the nations involved and affected?  
2. Is it legitimate according to the values of those involved and affected, and if it is not, can 
they be persuaded to accept a change in their values?  
3. And does the policy contribute to building community or undermining its evolution?  
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To form a regional community, Nikolas Gvosdev argues that shared interests must serve shared 
values and build community (Etzioni and Mitchell 2005: 22-23). Neo-Communitarian defines it 
as a foreign policy strategy where regional community will come about through the voluntary 
coordination of the activities of nation-states to combat transnational threats. Neo-
Communitarians encourage transnational moral dialogue which can enable people of different 
nations to come to shared moral understandings on issues ranging from global warming to 
humanitarian intervention. At the same time, Neo-Communitarianism favours a shift from a 
state-centric to people-centric focus. Thus, the Communitarian position is more tolerant of limits 
to individual rights where those limits reflect culture, and more concerned with sovereignty of 
states, except where intervention is inspired by demands for national self-determination, in the 
face of genocide or in response to previous intervention. Regarding international relations: 
Michael Walzer draws on the just-war and international-law traditions, and cautions against 
interventions except under specific circumstances (Etzioni and Mitchell, 2005: 22-23). The 
“constructive engagement” promoted by ASEAN leaders can be justified in Walzer‟s term. 
 
THE ASEAN COMMUNITY: NEO-COMMUNITARIANISM FOR DEPOLARIZATION 
 
As mention earlier, ASEAN wants to maintain its argument based on the principle of common 
good. The principle of common good is essential in order for ASEAN to construct its new 
agenda of the ASEAN Community. This is in line with John Dewey (1927/1954: ch. 5) who 
argued that the attainment of the common good (or public good) is the result of citizens 
participating in a community. It is most important to note that this participation is grounded in 
and through the act of communication. It is by sharing signs, symbols, and acts of togetherness 
that human beings both assert and achieve their humanity. Dewey wrote:  
 “To learn to be a human is to develop through the give-and-take of 
communication an effective sense of being an individually distinctive member of 
a community…one who understands its beliefs, desires and methods, and who 
contributes to a further conversion of organic powers into human resources and 
values…The nature of the only possible solution (lies in) the perfecting of the 
means and ways of communication of meanings so that genuinely shared interests 
in the consequences of interdependent activities may inform desire and effort and 




In terms of the common good, it is only through democracy understood as an experiment in self-
government that the public can find its voice and thereby gain recognition. This idea of active 
experimentation makes it necessary to lay down certain conditions for communal life. From the 
standpoint of the individual, it consists in having a responsible share according to capacity in 
forming and directing the activities of groups to which one belongs and in participating 
according to need in the values which the group sustains. From the standpoint of the groups, it 
demands liberation of the potentialities of members of a group in harmony with the interests and 
goods which are common (Dewey 1927/1954: 147). Dewey allowed for no privileged hiding 
places in this search for the common good. The private and the public spheres constitute different 
dimensions of human experience, but they are not opposed. In seeking their harmonious 
relations, according to Joseph Grange, we have to establish what is best and most unique about 
ourselves (Sani 2010). Thereby we abide in the highest good. The argument put forth by 
communitarians is that a state is a political being that thrives in stable regional and international 
associations and communities.  
 
In line with Dewey‟s argument, the adoption of both the “Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord II (Bali Concord II)” and the “Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the 
Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015” by ASEAN Heads of States indicate that the 
member states acknowledge that an integrated, stable, knowledgeable and caring community will 
help ASEAN nations to strengthen their economic competitiveness and attractiveness to 
investors, in particular during economic downturn. The three pillars of the ASEAN Community, 
namely the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC) and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), are the most crucial areas deemed 
necessary for the progress and evolution of ASEAN and its peoples. The ASEAN charter is One 
Vision, One Identity, One Community (Chiam 2009). 
 
The ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) draws towards a rules-based 
Community of shared values and norms; a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with 
shared responsibility for comprehensive security including a dynamic and outward-looking 
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region in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world (Chiam 2009). It seeks to mainly 
achieve an enhancement in political stability, democracy and good governance through creating 
a just, democratic and harmonious environment. This is clear that the ASEAN Community will 
always protect or stress on shared values and norms and prioritise responsibilities/duties over 
rights. This also shows that the ASEAN Community does not exactly accept the Neo-
Communitarian approach, rather it maintains its original Old-Communitarian approach. This is 
because ASEAN leaders still believe that the “ASEAN Way” concept should be maintained and 
the non-interference principle should always be applied in inter-state relations within the 
ASEAN Community.   
 
The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint is “a region of equitable economic 
development” that includes human resource development, information and communication 
technologies, capacity building, poverty reduction and improvement in quality of life (Chiam 
2009). It was previously claimed that economic rights can be more important than political 
rights, and that it is necessary to focus on economic development. At the current level of 
development in Southeast Asia, it is maintained that people‟s economic well-being must assume 
primary importance and this justifies the „economics first‟ argument. Some ASEAN leaders still 
claim that political stability is of primary importance to economic development, and a strong 
government is best able to assure the required stability. One argument is that economic progress 
can be best achieved by a government that need not deal with political opposition. To be sure, 
multinational corporations are more likely to invest in Southeast Asia if it is viewed as being able 
to provide a stable and secure environment. Former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir 
Mohamad used to dispute the notion that freedom and human rights are pre-requisite for 
economic success. He argues that:  
 “The West tells us that democratic freedom and human rights are fundamental for 
the achievement of economic and social development. We in ASEAN never 
disputed that democracy for the people and opportunity for the individual to 
develop his or her own greatest potentials are indeed important principles. We 
disagree, however, that democracy has only one definition or that political 
systems qualify as democratic only when they measure up to certain particular 
yard-stick. Similarly, the norms and precepts for the observance of human rights 
vary from society to society and from one period to another within the same 
society. Therefore, when the issue of human rights (including press freedom) are 
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linked to trade, investment and finance we cannot but view them as added 




What is obvious in the agenda of ASEAN Community is that the principle of „Economics First‟ 
will also be a priority for all member states. This seems like the Old Communitarian approach is 
still continuing to be protected. 
 
The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) is adopted to realise a people-oriented, 
socially responsible ASEAN community with the view of achieving solidarity, unity and a 
common identity as well as building a sharing and caring society (Chiam 2009). The 
characteristics envisaged in the ASCC Blueprint are human development; social welfare and 
protection; social justice and rights; ensuring environmental sustainability; building the ASEAN 
identity; and narrowing the development gap. In here, we can see that there is a transformation 
from a more state-centric ASEAN to a more people-centric Association.  
 
Under this blueprint, the ASEAN Human Rights Body is established and provided for in 
Article 14 of the ASEAN Charter. Article 14 (1) states : “In conformity with the purposes and 
principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body.” The mandate of 
the AHRB shall, therefore, include both promotion and protection of not only human rights but 
also fundamental freedoms. For ASEAN to pass the test of democracy building through the 
process of the establishment of an ASEAN Human Rights Body will require: (a) effective 
participation of civil society in the process of establishing the body and in its functioning; (b) the 
process of its establishment and its functioning to be transparent and inclusive; and (c) the body 
to be independent and impartial, in order for it to be able to hold the government accountable. It 
should also be equipped with monitoring powers. In sum, the legitimacy of ASEAN and of an 
ASEAN Human Rights Body needs to be assessed against normative democratic principles. As 
Eriksen and Fossum (2007: 3) put it, “democratic legitimacy requires public justification of the 
results to those who are affected by them”. Justification demands participation, accountability 




The human rights body later named the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights (ICHR) has the potential to issue statements and findings that may prove to be 
important catalysts for reform. While the dialogue-based, evolutionary approach adopted in the 
terms of reference (TOR) will likely limit the role of the ICHR to having only persuasive (rather 
than binding) authority on ASEAN governments, it has the potential to trigger further discussion 
on human rights issues, as well as open avenues for further action. The key will be to ensure that 
the ICHR does not obfuscate or diminish the positions of reform-minded individuals but, rather, 
strengthens them. To take a recent example, ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan made 
statements on behalf of the Association in July 2009 criticising the Burmese government‟s 
actions against pro-democracy freedom fighter Aung San Suu Kyii. At the time, Daw Suu Kyii 
faced trial for allegedly violating the terms of her house arrest by allowing an American to stay 
in her house after he swam across a lake to her home. Pitsuwan‟s stance was unusually strong for 
ASEAN, and he has since been criticised in some circles for his remarks. The question then 
becomes this: would statements like Surin‟s be permissible if an ICHR representative from the 
government being criticised was given overall authority to coordinate ASEAN‟s approach to 
human rights issues? (Kelsall 2009:6).  
 
Although many critics are concerned about the role played by the ASCC, Chiam Heng 
Keng (2009: 5-6) explains that a major human rights element in the ASCC Blueprint is the 
enhancement of “the well-being and livelihood of the peoples of ASEAN by providing them with 
equitable access to human development opportunities by promoting and investing in education 
and lifelong learning, human resource training and capacity building…” (page 2 of the ASEAN 
Socio-cultural Community Blueprint). This equitable access to human development is in 
accordance with the Declaration of the Right to Development adopted by the UN General 
Assembly on 4 December 1986 while the right to education is enunciated in several human rights 
declarations and instruments including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 26), 
the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 13), the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 28) and the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Article 10). Chiam said that there are three strategic 
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objectives have been identified to achieve this characteristic of the ASCC Blueprint, namely 
advancing and prioritising education, investing in human resource development and promotion 
of decent work. As regard to social welfare and protection, the ASCC Blueprint envisions 
addressing fully socioeconomic disparities and poverty by alleviating poverty and eradicating 
extreme poverty and hunger. This Blueprint also calls for access to primary healthcare of the 
vulnerable groups/ people at risk. This Blueprint specifically emphasises the promotion and 
protection of the rights and welfare of disadvantaged, vulnerable and marginalised groups such 
as women, children, the elderly, persons with disabilities and migrant workers. The 
implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of 
Migrant Workers is set forth as a strategic objective of the ASCC Blueprint to achieve this 
particular goal. Promoting corporate social responsibility to ensure sustainable socio-economic 
development in ASEAN member states and fostering sustainability of water resources to ensure 
equitable accessibility and sufficiency of acceptable quality of water are also aspects of human 
rights incorporated in the Blueprint. Moreover, there is definitely encouragement by ASEAN 
states to engage the civil society in ASEAN decision-making. Human rights are now becoming 
an important agenda for ASEAN states to practice. Therefore, ASCC can be a starting point to 
transform the “ASEAN Way” and ASEAN Community as a whole and the Neo-Communitarian 
approach is beginning to be applied through this pillar as well in acceptance of participation by 
the people. 
 
CURRENT AND URGENT ISSUES FACING ASEAN COMMUNITY 
 
There are many issues that can be discussed regarding the role of ASEAN as a community. 
However, this paper has selected three urgent issues that need to be resolved by ASEAN namely 




Zachary Abuza (2003: 9-10), one of the leading scholars on terrorism in Southeast Asia (SEA) 
claims that Southeast Asia has become a major “center of operations” for Al-Qaida operatives 
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for three primary reasons: the Afghan connection to Middle Eastern Al-Qaida and radical Islam 
extremists, the growth of Islamic grievances within Southeast Asian states since the 1970s for 
socioeconomic and political reasons, and, most important, that Southeast Asian states have 
become “countries of convenience” for international terrorists. He elaborates this thesis with the 
following arguments: “One of the aspects that made Southeast Asia so appealing to the Al-Qaeda 
leadership in the first place was the network of Islamic charities, the spread of poorly regulated 
Islamic banks, business-friendly environments, and economies that already had records of 
extensive money laundering. Al-Qaeda saw the region, first and foremost, as a back office for its 
activities (especially to set up front companies, fundraise, recruit, forge documents, and purchase 
weapons), and only later became a theater of operations in its own right as its affiliate 
organization in Southeast Asia, the Jemaah Islamiyah, developed its own capabilities.” 
 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an al-Qaeda affiliate, posed the greatest challenge to peace and 
security in the region. The series of arrests of JI operatives led the International Crisis Group 
(ICG) to view JI in Southeast Asia as “damaged”, but “still dangerous”. JI core members are 
bound together by “history, ideology, education, and marriage”. They share a commitment to 
implementing salafi teachings (a return to the pure Islam practiced by the Prophet) and to jihad. 
These bonds are likely to enable the JI network to survive counterterrorist efforts to dismantle it 
(ICG Asia Report 2003: 2). 
 
ASEAN‟s response to the scourge of transnational terrorism has been principally in the 
form of statements and declarations. ASEAN‟s efforts to address terrorism and transnational 
crime started even before the 9/11 event in the United States in 2001. ASEAN adopted the 
Declaration on Transnational Crime in 1997 and an ASEAN Action Plan to Combat 
Transnational Crime in 1999 to implement the Declaration. However, it was 9/11 that provided a 
strong stimulus for the region to come together to fight terrorism and related crimes through 
cooperation at the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels (Pushpanathan 2003). 
 
The commitment to fight terrorism as a region was endorsed at the highest level when the 
Heads of State/Government of the 10 member countries of ASEAN adopted the 2001 ASEAN 
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Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism at their Seventh ASEAN Summit on 5 
November 2001 in Brunei Darussalam (Pushpanathan 2003). The ASEAN Leaders viewed 
terrorism as a profound threat to international peace and security and “a direct challenge to the 
attainment of peace, progress and prosperity of ASEAN and the realisation of ASEAN Vision 
2020”. At the Eighth ASEAN Summit on 4 November 2002 in Phnom Penh, the ASEAN 
Leaders issued a Declaration on Terrorism, condemning the heinous terrorist attacks in Bali, 




The ASEAN Foreign Ministers have also called for closer cooperation and coordinated actions 
on tackling transnational crime among ASEAN countries. At the 29
th
 ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting (AMM) in Jakarta in July 1996, the Foreign Ministers recognised the need to focus 
attention on such crimes as narcotics trafficking, economic crimes, including money laundering, 
environmental crimes and illegal migration. They shared the view that the management of such 
transnational issues are urgently called for so that they would not affect the long-term viability of 
ASEAN and its individual member nations. At the 30
th
 AMM in Subang Jaya in July 1997, the 
Foreign Ministers stressed the need for sustained cooperation in addressing transnational 
concerns including the fight against terrorism trafficking of people, illicit drugs and arms, piracy 
and communicable disease. The Foreign Ministers reiterated the need for enhancing regional 
efforts against transnational crimes, such as illicit drug trafficking, terrorism, money laundering, 
and trafficking in women and children. At the meeting, the Ministers also signed the Joint 
Declaration for a Drug-Free ASEAN to eradicate the production, processing, traffic and use of 




There are some historical background and conceptual context considerations. The six ASEAN 
Member States (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand) stated in the Joint Communiqué at the 26th
 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in 
16 
 
Singapore, 23-24 July 1993, their collective view about human rights – which remains valid and 
relevant today: “The Foreign Ministers welcomed the international consensus achieved during 
the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, 14-25 June 1993, and reaffirmed ASEAN's 
commitment to and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in the Vienna 
Declaration of 25 June 1993.They stressed that human rights are interrelated and indivisible 
comprising civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. These rights are of equal 
importance. They should be addressed in a balanced and integrated manner and protected and 
promoted with due regard for specific cultural, social, economic and political circumstances. 




The Foreign Ministers agreed that ASEAN should coordinate a common approach on 
human rights and actively participate and contribute to the application, promotion and protection 
of human rights. They noted that the United Nations Charter had placed the question of universal 
observance and promotion of human rights within the context of international cooperation. They 
stressed that development is an inalienable right and that the use of human rights as a 
conditionality for economic cooperation and development assistance is detrimental to 
international cooperation and could undermine an international consensus on human rights. They 
emphasised that the protection and promotion of human rights in the international community 
should take cognizance of the principles of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. They were convinced that freedom, progress 
and national stability are promoted by a balance between the rights of the individual and those of 
the community, through which many individual rights are realised, as provided for in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
 
With the admission of Vietnam into ASEAN in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and 
Cambodia in 1999, ASEAN‟s political diversity has increased, making it more difficult for all 
the 10 Member States to agree on how to cooperate on human rights. Nevertheless, the drafters 
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of the ASEAN Charter, with the guidance of the 10 ASEAN Foreign Ministers, managed to 
provide for promotion and protection of human rights in the ASEAN Charter as follows:  
“ADHERING to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, 
respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms;” [in the Preamble]  
“7. To strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to 
promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the 
rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN;” [Article 1: Purposes]  
“2 (i) respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights, 
and the promotion of social justice;” [Article 2: Principles] and  
“1. In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall 
establish an ASEAN human rights body.  
“2. This ASEAN human rights body shall operate in accordance with the terms of 
reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.” [Article 14]  
And the informal Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism is 
recognized as one of the “other stakeholders in ASEAN” in Annex 2 of the ASEAN 
Charter.  
Since the Charter already entered into force on 15 December 2008, follow-up actions are being 
undertaken to fulfill the commitment on promotion and protection of human rights, including the 
establishment of the ASEAN human rights body (AHRB), based on the relevant provisions in the 





It is clear that several issues as explained earlier can disrupt the relations between ASEAN 
member states. Therefore, we have to answer this question: Would the ASEAN Community be 
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able to bring successful transformation in ASEAN where it was bogged down with so many 
issues which are also involved the identity of ASEAN itself? The other issue is whether all 
Member states are willing to sacrifice their national agenda and perhaps sovereignty for the sake 
of regional unity and effectiveness? International organisations could also assist regional bodies 
and member states in resolving disputes. As exemplified by ASEAN, when conciliation is not 
possible and interference with the national policies of a member state is not a viable option, 
resolving disputes becomes a significant challenge. What is clear is that ASEAN is still unready 
to disregard this concept of “ASEAN Way” and the principle of non-interference even though if 
an ASEAN Community is in place and implemented. Some formulations are needed to 
accommodate and maintain those concepts and principle in order to ensure an ASEAN 
Community is successful in practice. In sum, the ASEAN Community and Charter are the result 
of successful demands made by the liberals in transforming the Association. But it is also the 
success of Communitarians in transforming the Association and themselves to be continuously 
relevant in the regional context. 
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